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Chapter 4
Establishing the U.S. Navy
Pension Plan

From the earliest days of the American colonies and subsequently the
new republic, American naval personnel were promised pension beneWts if
they were injured in the service of their colony or nation. This chapter
begins with a review of the establishment of military pension plans by the
Continental Congress for seamen during the war for independence. Next,
the analysis focuses on how these early pension plans were then superseded
by a pension plan for the regular navy of the new United States. The history
of the navy pension plan as explored in this and the following four chapters provides considerable background material for understanding the subsequent evolution of employer pension plans and Social Security in the
United States as well as in other countries

Pension Plans for Naval Personnel Before 1800
In November 1775, only months after the onset of the American Revolution, the Continental Congress established a pension plan for naval personnel to be paid out of a fund Wnanced by the sale of “prizes” captured by
the Revolutionary navy. These prizes were either ships of war or merchantmen of belligerent states or neutral merchantmen carrying contraband. In
theory they constituted legitimate military targets under the generally
accepted though unwritten international laws of war and admiralty. As we
discussed in the previous chapter, this method of funding the early naval
pension plan is quite important in understanding naval compensation in
general and naval pensions in particular, and it illustrates how pensions
have been used to provide performance incentives. SpeciWcally, because
the ofWcers and crews received a share of the value of the prize, the prize
system rewarded seamen according to their success in identifying and capturing prizes, and it was this relationship among pension beneWts, funding
methods, and performance incentives that we seek to highlight throughout
much of this volume.
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The initial navy pension plan was actually a disability plan. With the exception of the Pennsylvania navy during the Revolution, American seamen were not eligible for retirement pensions until the nineteenth century,
though, as will become apparent below, the early disability plans were eventually converted to old-age pensions. The Wrst Continental navy plan paid
$400 in a lump sum, roughly one year’s salary, to a ship’s commander in the
event he should be disabled and the same to his widow should he be killed.
Subordinate ofWcers and their widows received proportionally smaller
amounts.1 The 1775 pension plan and the fund from which pensions were
to be paid did not survive the war. Detailed searches of primary sources
have not located any systematic records pertaining to the operation of this
initial pension plan, and in any case the 1775 plan was replaced by a new
pension plan established by the general pension act of August 1776, which
also covered army personnel (see Chapter 8 below).
At least part of the reason the 1775 plan did not survive is that the pension fund from which beneWts were to be paid was never properly established in the Wrst place. The legislation that created the navy pension plan
speciWed that ofWcers and seamen were to be paid from prize monies, even
if no prizes were taken during the action in which they were disabled. Thus, if prizes
were taken in the action that produced the disability, some of the monies
from the liquidation of prizes and contraband could be set aside for the
pensions of deserving seamen. But what if a seaman was disabled in an
action that did not produce prizes? Implicitly, the legislation meant that
there had to be a reserve fund established to provide funds for the payment
to at least some of the men disabled in naval service. Whether the Congress
failed to recognize this or whether the fund simply was not established
before the pension plan was revised in 1776 has not been determined. In
any case, the lack of funding, the relatively high promised beneWts, and the
pressures of an expanding war soon led to the termination of this initial
naval pension plan.
The 1776 plan speciWed that if an ofWcer, seaman, or marine were completely disabled during an engagement in which no prize was taken, then
the individual was to receive one-half of his monthly pay for the term of
his disability. If the seaman was not completely disabled but nevertheless
could not continue his naval service, he was to receive a reduced pension,
with the actual amount of the pension determined by the legislature of the
state in which he resided. If the seaman were disabled in an engagement in
which a prize was taken, then his share of the prize was subtracted from the
value of his pension. Exactly how this was done is not altogether clear.
Theoretically, one could calculate the present value of the pension annuity,
subtract the seaman’s share of the prize or prizes captured during the voyage on which he was disabled, and then reconvert the remainder into an
annuity. The few accounts of Revolutionary pensions that can be found in
the records of the colonial governments do not suggest that this procedure
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was used, at least not explicitly. Subsequent legislation in 1778 extended the
beneWts of the 1776 plan to ofWcers and men disabled prior to the plan’s
introduction. This expansion in coverage meant that the disability claims
under the 1775 plan were honored, at least nominally.
Like its precursor, the 1776 plan ran into problems as a result of the
failure of the Continental Congress to provide sufWcient funds for beneWt
payments to claimants. Although the two plans were funded differently,
they both collapsed because of inefWcient administration and cumbersome
administrative structures. The fundamental problem was that, although
Congress authorized the plans and payments to veterans, the colonies (or
states, as they soon became) were given the responsibility for administering
them. Unfortunately, this scheme ran into the same three obstacles that
frustrated the new government’s Wnancial solvency until the administration
of federal public Wnance was reorganized during the Wrst Washington
administration. These general administrative problems were (1) the Wnancial status of the states was as bad as that of the federal government; (2) the
various administrative structures overseeing naval affairs were a morass of
conXicting lines of authority; and (3) Congressional actions could only be
carried out if states passed the necessary enabling legislation.
First, with respect to state Wnances, the Wnancial condition of the state
governments was generally as precarious as that of the federal government,
if not more so. Hence any claims against a state were likely to compete for
very scarce funds with a host of other military and civil claims. Thus, the
federal mandates requiring state spending often went unmet. The inability
or unwillingness of the states to pay Continental pensions was partly the
result of genuine Wscal distress and partly the result of the reluctance by
local legislators to take responsibility for imposing the taxes required to satisfy the political wishes of the federal government, such as it was. None of
the colonies was in a position to Wnance a war with the British empire.
Although in theory they might have possessed the tax base to maintain a
rebellion, they did not possess the requisite bureaucratic infrastructure for
administering the public Wnances that such a tax base could, again theoretically, support. As a result, a kind of public Wnance triage occurred in the
face of war. Navy pensions did not survive, at least not in their original form.
Second, the administration of the Continental navy was, to put it politely,
cumbersome. For several months after the Revolution began, there was no
Continental navy. There were naval forces attached to George Washington’s
army. These forces, which persisted after the formal establishment of the
Continental navy in October of 1775, were thereafter, and appropriately
enough, known as “Washington’s navy.” Shortly after the navy was created,
a seven-member Naval Committee was created to administer the assets of
the new navy. The members of the committee were appointed by Congress
and given the charge of providing nominal oversight of naval affairs. The
Marine Committee subsequently replaced, or as one naval historian puts it
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“absorbed,” the Naval Committee. The new committee consisted of one
representative from each colony. The Marine Committee created two administrative groups that were intended to simplify the management of naval
affairs. Navy Boards were created in the key ports of Boston and Philadelphia, and these boards oversaw the Wnancial transactions of the Marine
Committee and subsequent executive committees. In addition, prize agents
responsible for the liquidation of prizes captured by the Continental navy
or Continental privateers were established to oversee the disbursement of
monies that resulted from the prize system. At the same time, various Naval
Agents managed the day-to-day operations in American ports, and Wnally,
the Naval OfWce in Paris largely administered affairs outside the colonies.
While in theory these ofWces were created to more effectively administer the
sea war, the Marine Committee was a frequent target of both the Congress
and the armed forces, with its cumbersome structure among the main complaints. As a result, the Board of Admiralty, consisting of two members of
Congress and three “public members,” replaced the committee in October
of 1779. In practice, the lines of authority and the relationships between
these governmental units were poorly deWned, if they were deWned at all.
SpeciWcally, it was often unclear which unit was primarily responsible for
acquiring ships, stores, and men.
Overall, this administrative structure, and the confusion wrought by the
winds of war, yielded a public Wnance morass. After it replaced the Marine
Committee in 1779, the Board of Admiralty ordered the naval boards and
agents to present naval accounts, receipts, invoices, and other documents
for review. However, “Owing to the loose methods of business which obtained during the Revolution, the agents of the Board [of Admiralty]
found it in most cases impossible to make such statements” concerning
naval Wnances based on the accounts available (Paullin 1906). Congress
recognized that naval Wnances and accounts were in a state of near hopeless
disorder. In an effort to consolidate the management of naval affairs, an
attempt was made in February 1781 to appoint a Secretary of Marine to
oversee the administrative reforms of naval affairs. The person chosen for
this task was Major General Alexander McDougall, who demanded, as a
condition of appointment, that he be permitted to maintain his ofWce and
rank in the Continental army while serving as secretary. For reasons perhaps having as much to do with the personalities involved as philosophical
commitments to a separation of powers, such an arrangement was unacceptable to Congress, and McDougall was dropped from consideration.
In the summer of 1781, Robert Morris, then Superintendent of Finance,
assumed the Wnancial responsibilities for naval affairs. In September of that
year, he was named Agent of Marine, an ofWce he held until November
1784. In this dual capacity, Morris, who earned the sobriquet “Financier of
the Revolution,” effectively served as minister of Wnance and secretary of
the navy for the nascent republic, at least in an administrative sense. He
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soon began the thorny process of reorganizing naval Wnances, including
pension liabilities.
The third problem with the pension act of 1776 was related to the fact
that it directed the states to pay federal pensions to their seaman serving in
the Continental navy. However, before the actual payment of the pension
beneWts could be made, the states themselves were required to establish
an infrastructure for administering Continental navy pensions. Thus, the
funding of naval pensions became an issue of dispute between the states
and the federal government that had to be resolved before the payment
of pensions could begin. These differences were not meaningfully settled
until Alexander Hamilton’s Wnancial reforms in the 1790s. Actually, the
pension accounts were not Wnally settled for more than a century. As late as
1905, South Carolina and other states were still prosecuting Revolutionary
naval claims against the U.S. government (Paullin 1906). Further complicating this administrative structure was the fact that most of the colonies
maintained their own naval forces, which were separate from those of the
Continental Congress. All of the colonies except Delaware and New Jersey
maintained some naval forces. Between May 1777 and June 1782, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland passed legislation authorizing
the payment of naval pensions to ofWcers, marines, and seamen serving in
either their navies or to their citizens serving in the Continental navy, or to
both. Ultimately, the U.S. Congress assumed responsibility for the payment
of the Revolutionary navy’s pensions beneWts.
Like other Western naval forces over the past millennium or so, a key
component of the early Continental navy compensation in general and
pensions in particular was the share of the prize that was allocated to the
crew. In November 1775, the Continental Congress, attempting to provide
“encouragement” to sailors to more efWciently complete their assignment,
declared that one-half of all ships of war and one-third of merchantmen and
other ships, such as transport and stores vessels, were reserved as compensation for the ofWcers and crews that captured them.2 A few weeks later the
Congress further revised naval regulations (and established the aforementioned pension plan). Among these revisions were the speciWcations that
the man who originally spotted a prize would receive a double share of the
prize money, the man who Wrst boarded a prize would receive a treble share,
and an additional ten shares were to be divided among those men whom
the ofWcers thought most deserving.
The legislation of 1775 also established prize courts, or at least it
requested that every colony establish a prize court, with the Congress serving as a court of appeals. It also established sanctioned privateering by the
Continental government. As we saw in the previous chapter, privateers had
been around for centuries. They were essentially, licensed pirates who
in exchange for their license agreed to limit their predatory activities to
enemy ships and contraband carried by neutrals. Privateers were to receive
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100 percent of the net prize. Since privateers received 100 percent of their
prizes, it would at Wrst appear that no one would join the Continental navy
when they could be privateers. But there were at least three features of regular naval service that might induce one to join the navy rather than
become a privateer. For one thing the navy paid, or at least promised to pay,
regular wages on top of the prize share. For another, the privateers were
often manned by, shall we say, those at or beyond the fringes of decent society. Among the many features of privateering that might not appeal to
everyone was the privateer’s reputation for mistreating individuals who
fell into their hands. Finally, regular naval forces did not accord captured
privateers the same respect and treatment that they extended to their counterparts in the regular navy. Privateers were on occasion hanged from a
yardarm with impunity. Taken together, these features suggest that privateering may not have been for everyone.
In addition to these features of the act, Congress speciWed that the division of prizes captured by the naval forces of the colonies should be the
same as those of the Continental navy. Making the situation even more
interesting was the fact that ofWcers could, and did from time to time, “pay
out” the more liquid components of prizes before those cases were ofWcially
adjudicated. Although typically in violation of both a country’s explicit military code of conduct and the unwritten, though in many cases no less
explicit, laws of war, ofWcers were known to appease their men with the
fruits of a prize before its full value was determined in a prize court. Since
the rulings of prize courts were risky and because the disbursement of prize
monies could take long periods of time, the seamen’s loyalty and effort
could often be had at a discount. This type of activity probably occurred
much more often than the ofWcial records suggest.
In any case, the original plan for distributing prizes was subsequently
altered, and prize monies were explicitly reallocated under legislation of
January 1776. All prizes accruing to the ofWcers and crew were divided into
twenty shares. The commander-in-chief received one-twentieth (or one
share), the captains of the Xeet two-twentieths, the ofWcers of the ship eight
and one-half shares, and the men were to equally divide the remaining eight
and one-half shares. In October of that year, Congress increased the shares
going to the ofWcers and crews to one-half of merchantmen and 100 percent
of ships of war and British privateers. Since merchantmen were less well
armed and would be laden with valuable cargo, as opposed to the less valuable sinews of war found upon a ship of the line or enemy sloop, they were
preferred pickings among naval forces. Recall Napoleon’s characterization
of his admirals’ preferences. So Congress found it expedient to induce the
navy to go after ships of war as opposed to those of commerce.
Eventually, the speciWcations concerning the allocation of monies from
prizes captured by the navies of the colonies were revoked in March 1776.
Thereafter, each colony could establish its own rules, and it turned out that
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there was considerable variation across colonies. For example, Massachusetts returned only one-third of the prize to the ofWcers and men whereas
Pennsylvania allowed the crews to keep two-thirds.
As seen earlier, historically naval compensation was based on deferred
or backloaded payments and “piecework.” The promise of a pension was
the deferred component; while the prizes seized by the crew’s own efforts
represented a form of piecework. Thus, it was only natural that these two
features would be combined and that naval pensions would eventually be
funded from prize monies. From its inception, the pension plan for U.S.
naval personnel was to be funded from assets purchased from the sale of
naval prizes. As a result, the Xow of prize monies did not always match the
pension plan’s liabilities. The lack of actuarial assessments linking the
inXow of assets to the liabilities, coupled with the political (and Wnancial)
pressures faced by Congress and its responses to those pressures, made for
a rather colorful history of the post-Revolution U.S. navy pension plan.
Furthermore, the experiences of the navy pension plan provide numerous
lessons for contemporary pension policy. In the following section and subsequent chapters, this history is described and analyzed in an effort to compare policy choices of the nineteenth century to those of the twenty-Wrst
century.

Establishing the Navy Pension Plan
Although the Continental navy eventually went the way of the navy pension
plan, after the Constitution was ratiWed Congress eventually created a U.S.
navy. From its earliest days, the United States government authorized separate pension systems for the army and naval forces. Congress created the
Wrst pension plan for the “regular” or “standing” army in 1790. Between
1794 and the creation of the Department of the Navy in 1798, naval personnel were covered under the U.S. army pension plan. Under this plan,
beneWts were paid from annual appropriations. The creation of a separate
navy department complicated the administration of navy pensions. Since
congressional appropriations went to speciWc departments, in essence, or
perhaps it should be said in a bureaucratic sense, the army was asked not
only to administer navy pensions but to pay them as well. Given the rivalry
and occasional outright hostilities between the services, this arrangement
was probably untenable in the long run.
Further complicating matters was the economics of navy compensation
during this era. The important role that incentive-based compensation played
in ameliorating the incentive to shirk by naval personnel was discussed in
Chapter 3. Traditional military pay was not likely to be an efWcient method
of compensation for an eighteenth-century navy. In March 1799, Congress
eased the bureaucratic complications associated with having the army
administer navy pensions by establishing a separate administration for the
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payment of navy pensions. In the following year, Congress addressed the
fundamental moral hazard in naval compensation and created a funded
navy pension plan that was once again to be funded with the monies from
captured prizes.
The revisions to these pension plans in the 1790s maintained the essential features of the original plan: ofWcers’ beneWts were not to exceed halfpay, while those for seamen and marines were not to exceed $5.00 a month.
These were annuities to be paid during the period of disability. When the
fund from which these beneWts were to be paid actually began disbursing
payments in 1801, 18 years after the Treaty of Paris formally ended the
Revolutionary War, there were 22 navy pensioners, and the average annual
payment per recipient was $72.95. Because of the fundamental reorganization of the republic’s Wnances, which was largely the work of Alexander
Hamilton, this navy pension plan was to have a substantially longer life than
its antecedents. A growing economy, a funded debt, a sound currency, and
a national bank all contributed in various ways to public Wnances of the
United States, and ultimately some combination of these features would
be required to ensure the soundness of the navy pension plan. In the short
run, however, it was the fortunes of the navy in its quest for prizes that determined the success, such as it was, of the plan.
The Constitution granted Congress the authority “To provide and maintain a navy [and]: To make rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces.” However, when the Constitution was ratiWed, the
United States had no navy. The last armed vessel of the Continental navy,
the frigate Alliance, had been sold in 1785 (Paullin 1906). The U.S. Navy
was not formally established until 1794, when Congress authorized the
construction of six new frigates. At that time, it also began the recruitment
of ofWcers and men. The Wrst three frigates, Constitution, Constellation, and
United States, were commissioned in 1797. Beginning in 1794, there were
1,856 uniformed personnel in the navy. An additional 83 marines were
added the year the ships were launched.3 In the age of sail, the marines
served three purposes: They represented something of a constabulary
aboard ship; they aided in Wring upon and boarding other ships (and repelling boarders when the situations were reversed); and they could be
used in land operations mounted from ships.
The act of 1799, which established a navy pension plan separate from the
one controlled by the army, explicitly stated that ofWcers, marines, and seamen injured in the line of duty were entitled to a disability pension. The
beneWt for ofWcers was not to exceed half-pay while the pension for marines
and seamen was not to exceed $5.00 a month. To give the reader a feel for
the size of this beneWt, consider that in 1812, a captain in the U.S. navy
earned $100 per month and “eight rations”—essentially a payment in kind;
seamen earned $10 per month. For both types of personnel, the beneWt was
to be based on the length and extent of the disability. The legislation also
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authorized the establishment of a separate navy pension fund from which
pensions were to be paid. The navy pension fund itself was established in
1800. Like the initial Revolutionary navy pension plan of 1775, the navy
pension plan began as a disability pension plan; however, it also eventually
evolved into a retirement plan. Like the early pension plans for naval personnel, this fund was to be Wnanced by the sale of prizes.
Two additional aspects of the U.S. navy pension fund should be mentioned. First, the monies in the fund were to be used for the exclusive
beneWt of navy personnel and their families, and second, if these monies
were insufWcient to provide promised beneWts, the U.S. Treasury was to
honor the pension liabilities. These points were made clear in the ninth section of the enabling legislation, which stated that:
all money accruing, or which has already accrued to the United States from the sale
of prizes, shall be and remain forever a fund for the payment of pensions and half
pay, should the same be hereafter granted to the ofWcers and seamen who may be
entitled to receive the same; and if the said fund shall be insufWcient for the purpose, the public faith is hereby pledged to make up the deWciency. But, if it should
be more than sufWcient; the surplus shall be applied to the making of further provision for the comfort of the disabled ofWcers, seamen and marines, and for such as,
though not disabled, may merit, by their bravery or long and faithful services, the
gratitude of their country. (American State Papers, Naval Affairs, 1934, 4: no. 529;
hereafter ASP-NA)

Note carefully the wording of the legislation. If the pension should experience windfalls, then those could be applied to “further provision for the
comfort” of the beneWciaries, but if the fund proved “insufWcient for the
purpose,” then the public—that is, the taxpayers—stood behind the fund’s
liabilities. The subsequent history of the fund would test the limits of these
words.
The basic characterisitics of the naval pension plan are consistent with
the economic model of military pensions described in Chapter 2. Furthermore, the emergence of a fund coincided with a period in which opportunities for seizing prizes were expanding because of rising tensions with
the French, which marked a transition from revolutionary times. Under
the doctrine that the enemy of an enemy is a friend, the ancien régime
in France had supported the colonists in the American Revolution. Unfortunately for the champions of that policy, Wnancing the American Wght
for independence drove the French crown to the brink of insolvency. The
French had not yet adopted the principle of the separation of crown and
state Wnances, the efWcacy of which the British had discovered during their
own civil war more than a century earlier. As a result, attempts at Wscal
reform by the crown accelerated the political forces that ultimately produced the French Revolution.
As the Convention was deposing Louis XVI, and as France was engaged
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in a war with Britain, Prussia, Austria, Spain and the Dutch Republic (the
War of the First Coalition), the administration of George Washington was
repairing its rocky relationship with the British. Since neither the French
nor the British had any desire to land troops on U.S. soil, these conXicts
were largely played out on the high seas by both naval forces and privateers.
Most of the disputes between the United States and Great Britain were
settled, or at least temporarily papered over, by Jay’s Treaty of 1794, which
ushered in a brief period of U.S.-British amity. Although this goodwill
proved to be rather short lived, it was too much for the French Revolutionary regime and a de facto naval war between France and the United
States ensued. Thus, the U.S. navy and its pension plans were born as much
out of political and military expediency as economic efWciency.
The disability plan almost became a true retirement plan as early as 1801.
With the change in administrations from Adams’s to Jefferson’s, the navy was
subjected to a severe reduction in funds. Only 45 ofWcers above the rank of
midshipman were kept on active duty (Miller 1997, p. 45). Secretary of the
Navy Benjamin Stoddert proposed creating a “half-pay” retirement system
like that of the royal navy (see Chapter 3 above). The proposal was soundly
rejected by the Jefferson administration, and instead the discharged ofWcers
were given only four months’ pay. It would be several decades before a “regular” navy pension plan along the lines of Stoddert’s proposal became law.
The dismemberment of the navy proved to be shortsighted. Reversing the
political realignment of the 1790s, American policy eventually became
strongly anti-British. This policy reXected national sentiment and the fact
the British had waged a particularly nasty and aggressive naval war against
France, her allies, and anyone doing business with either. These tensions
culminated in the War of 1812. The war provided numerous opportunities
for the seizure of prizes and the U.S. navy proved to be rather efWcient in
this activity. As a result, the assets in the navy pension fund expanded. As
the fund grew, the commissioners found the pension system increasingly
difWcult to manage through three federal departments (Navy, Treasury, and
War). Consequently, they requested that Congress place the pension fund
under a single department; however, it was not until 1832 that the Secretary
of the Navy was made the sole manager of the pension fund.
The various laws establishing the navy pension plan and the fund from
which beneWts were to be paid also speciWed the fund’s administrative
structure and management as well as eligibility conditions for receipt of
pension beneWts. The 1800 legislation “An Act for the Better Government
of the Navy of the United States” also speciWed that the commissioners of
the pension fund must provide annual reports to Congress concerning the
operations of the fund. Many of these reports have survived as ofWcial government records and provide considerable information on the activities of
the pension fund. These original reports are a primary source of information and data employed in this volume.
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The 1800 act revised the pension beneWt formula so that “every ofWcer,
seaman and marine, disabled in the line of his duty, shall be entitled to
receive for life, or during his disability, a pension from the United States,
according to the nature and degree of his disability, not exceeding one-half
of his monthly pay” (ASP-NA, 4: no. 529). The monthly pay of a seaman in
the U.S. navy in the early nineteenth century was in the neighborhood of
$12; lieutenants earned $40 a month and captains $100 plus “rations”
(Lebergott 1964; ASP-NA, 1).4
To receive a disability pension, a claimant had to complete an application indicating the circumstances of the injury, when it occurred, the extent
of the injury, and the extent of the disability that resulted from the injury.
The application had to be signed by the company surgeon and commanding ofWcer. Injuries could result in a partial or total disability and the
amount of the pension depended on the extent of the disability. Table 4.1
indicates the relationship between various disabilities and the level of
beneWts paid by the navy pension plan. Such a schedule was on the books
over a very long period of time. The schedule shown in Table 4.1 is for
two checkpoint dates, showing the changes in the absolute and relative
amounts for various injuries over time. The basic concept of the disability
pensions is that the amount of the pension is related to the extent of
the injury. Pensions were forfeited if the veteran was convicted of a felony
(ASP-NA, 4: 427).
Table 4.2 contains a listing of the number of beneWciaries, the total
amount of annual beneWts paid, and the average beneWt per recipient for
each year between 1800 and 1842.5 The Wgures show that the number of
beneWciaries, the total cost associated with their pensions, and per capita
expenditures generally increased during the life of the pension fund. There
were 22 pensioners in 1801 receiving annual beneWts of $1,605 for an average of $72.95 per recipient. By 1842, the number of beneWciaries had increased to 946 and annual outlays were $107,129 or an average of $113.24
per recipient for “ordinary” beneWts. Including “extraordinary” payments,
the payment per beneWciary was $232.60, and a total of $220,053 was paid
in beneWts during the year.
The estimates of extraordinary payments are largely compensation for
“back” beneWts, as required by subsequent legislation. To assist readers in
assessing the value of beneWts and earnings, Appendix A provides a consistent price index from 1800 to 1999. Multiplying the dollar values shown in
Table 4.2 by the factors for the corresponding year in Appendix Table A.1
produces an estimate of beneWts and assets in December 1999 dollars.
In its Wrst decade of operation, the assets of the pension fund seemed to
be sufWcient to pay promised liabilities for many years in the future. In addition, the steady infusion of prize monies produced considerable growth in
the size of the fund. With an investment of almost $30,000, interest income
comfortably exceeded any immediate payouts. The value of the fund itself
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increased from 1800 through 1807 due to, among other things, the delayed
receipt of the sale of prizes from earlier naval conXicts with Britain and
France, as well as the excess of investment returns over outlays. During
the War of 1812, prizes became more abundant, the value of the fund
Table 4.1. Statutory Rates for Permanent SpeciWc Disabilities for Military
Pensions as of 1872 and 1904
Disabilities
Loss of both hands
Loss of both feet
Loss of sight of both eyes
Loss of sight of one eye,
the sight of the other having
been lost before enlistment
Loss of one hand and one foot
Loss of a hand or a foot
Loss of an arm at or above
the elbow or a leg at or
above the knee
Loss of either a leg at the
hip joint or an arm at the
shoulder joint, or so near
as to prevent the use of
an artiWcial limb
Loss of a leg at hip joint
Loss of an arm at shoulder joint
Total disability in both hands
Total disability in both feet
Total disability in one hand
and one foot
Total disability in one hand
or one foot
Total disability in arm or leg
Disability equivalent to the loss
of a hand or a foot (third grade)
Incapacity to perform manual
labor (second grade)
Regular aid and attendance
(second grade)
Frequent and periodical, not
constant, aid and attendance
(intermediate grade)
Total deafness

1872

1904

$31.25
31.25
31.25

$100.00
100.00
100.00

31.25
24.00
18.00

100.00
60.00
40.00

18.00

46.00

—
24.00
18.00
31.25
31.25

55.00
55.00
55.00
31.25
31.25

24.00

60.00

18.00
18.00

40.00
46.00

18.00

24.00

24.00

30.00

31.25

72.00

—
13.00

50.00
40.00

Source: Edited from Glasson (1918, 133) based on Laws of the United States Governing the
Granting of Army and Navy Pensions, compiled under the direction of the Commissioner of
Pensions, 1916 edition, 110.
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Table 4.2. History of the U.S. Navy Pension Plan, 1800–1842
Year

Pensioners

1800
1801
1802
1803
1804
1805
1806
1807
1808
1809
1810
1811
1812
1813
1814
1815
1816
1817
1818
1819
1820
1821
1822
1823
1824
1825
1826
1827
1828
1829
1830
1831
1832
1833
1834
1835
1836
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841
1842

—
22
—
37
37
49
65
78
85
90
93
107
122
148
176
252
327
358
—
438
480
491
431
423
524
524
533
534
570
596
536
536
—
—
—
442
466
678
847
901
914
959
946

Annual a
outlays
—
$1,605
—
3,567
3,261
4,413
5,298
6,396
6,863
6,671
7,043
8,045
9,287
11,273
13,667
20,547
27,627
32,036
34,970
39,340
43,863
44,488
38,772
37,248
—
—
49,653
—
—
—
31,938
—
—
—
—
54,083
58,009
200,689
216,042
223,045
221,675
226,825
220,053

Per capita
outlays
—
$72.95
—
96.40
88.13
90.06
85.51
82.00
80.74
74.12
75.73
75.19
76.12
76.17
77.65
81.54
84.49
89.49
—
89.82
91.38
90.61
89.96
88.06
—
—
93.16
—
—
—
59.58
—
—
—
—
122.36
124.48
296.00
255.06
247.55
242.53
236.52
232.61

Source: Authors’ calculations based on Clark et al. (1999a, b) and original sources cited
therein.
a
The Wgures from 1837 through 1842 include two extraordinary treasury remittances resulting from the act of 1837. These remittances appear to have been passed “straight through” a
cash position to beneWciaries.
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increased, and by 1831, the fund had assets of one million dollars. The lack
of synchronization of the increase in the value of the fund due to prizes
relative to the war years was due to the difWculty in getting the purveyors
of the prizes in various ports to remit their sales receipts to the fund. This
problem was a pervasive feature of the prize system since its inception and
in all belligerent countries. Indeed, it was just such disputes associated with
the disbursement of prize money from the war with Spain that, among other
things, led Congress to Wnally abolish the whole system in 1899 (Oliver 1946).
With respect to the navy pension plan, subsequent actions to extend coverage and to increase beneWts seem to have been taken without regard for
the actuarial conditions facing the fund. For example, in 1813, beneWts
were extended to the widows of navy personnel who died as a result of a
wound received in the line of duty. These beneWts were equal to half the
monthly pay of the deceased and were to be paid for a Wve-year term.
Payments could be renewed for additional terms of Wve years each. If no
surviving widow existed, these survivors’ beneWts could be paid to children
under 16 years of age. In addition, in the annual report Wled in January
1816, the commissioners concluded that limiting the beneWt to half-pay:
proved inadequate to the maintenance of disabled seamen and marines, particularly
the latter, which cannot exceed three dollars per month. The extension of the law,
so as to vest in the commissioners a discretionary power to allow, in extreme cases,
to the full amount of monthly pay, or otherwise to provide for the necessary subsistence of those who are totally unable to take care of themselves, would, it is believed,
obviate causes of complaint, and reXect honor upon the liberality and justice of the
National Legislature. (ASP-NA, 1).

As requested, in April 1816, the commissioners were given the ability to provide beneWts in excess of half-pay in cases of exceptional hardship. This
expansion of beneWts and the extension of beneWts to widows and orphans,
along with the growth of naval personnel during the War of 1812, dramatically increased the total annual outlay of pension beneWts.
Furthermore, adding widows and orphans to the pension rolls involved
more than just increasing the number of pensioners at the time. An added
actuarial complexity was the longevity of the obligation. As an example,
consider that “in 1906, 123 years after the close of the Revolution, there
still remained one widow of a Revolutionary soldier on the pension list,
Esther S. Damon of Plymouth Union, Vt., 92 years of age” (Glasson 1918).
There also remained “a few aged daughters of Revolutionary soldiers who
had been pensioned by special acts of Congress.” The navy pension fund
also had a problem with keeping track of the list of pensioners on the rolls.
In response to an audit request from Congress, in January 1836, without
irony, the navy admitted that “some of the names on this list may be dead”
(ASP-NA, 4).
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In 1816, payments of $27,627 were paid to 327 veterans, widows, and
orphans. In 1817, beneWts to widows and orphans were expanded to include
those whose husband or father had died “in consequence of disease contracted or of casualties or injuries received” (emphasis added). If a veteran’s dependents could show that his eventual death was in some way
connected to his previous service, then they would be eligible for beneWts.
This extension sharply increased expenditures, and by 1823, annual expenditures totaling $37,248 were paid to 423 beneWciaries. In 1824, this provision, along with that for widows and orphans, was repealed because of the
now obvious drain on the pension fund. Persons already receiving beneWts
were allowed to continue receiving payments; however, the act stipulated
that no future pensions would be awarded to widows or orphans. Despite
this change, the total number of beneWciaries continued to increase, reaching 596 in 1829. Even with the increased expenditures associated with this
growth, the fund continued to grow, reaching $950,675 in the same year.
By the early 1830s, the fund’s assets approached one million dollars. At
the same time, the number of pensioners was stabilizing. Thus, the pension
system appeared to be in excellent Wnancial condition, with sufWcient assets
to pay promised beneWts for years to come. With the pension fund in such
sound Wnancial condition, Congress was unable to resist the temptation to
expand the coverage of the pension plan. In June 1834, Congress restored
the provisions for widow and orphan beneWts that existed between 1817 and
1824. The legislation also extended beneWts to widows of ofWcers, seamen,
and marines who had died since 1824. These actions substantially increased
plan liabilities with no additional funding.
The ofWcial account of this episode in the American State Papers makes the
case that the fund could adequately support this expansion of beneWts
(ASP-NA, 4). Given the lack of new monies resulting from prizes and the
aging of the veterans of the War of 1812, it is difWcult to support such a
claim with any plausible actuarial scenarios. Whether the ofWcial account
simply reXects political opportunism or ignorance of Wnancial arithmetic is
unclear. In either case, and not surprisingly, this extension of beneWts resulted in “a heavy charge [being] made upon the fund” (ASP-NA, 4). The magnitude of the Wnancial impact on the pension system is revealed by noting the
size of the awards to the new beneWciaries. Only 56 widows had been granted
a pension beneWt under the terms of all previous acts. This new legislation
added 80 widows to the rolls at an annual sum of $20,031, an amount equal
to nearly 40 percent of the whole of navy pensions (ASP-NA, 4). The aging
of the veterans of the War of 1812 only compounded this problem, both
directly through their disabilities and indirectly through their deaths.
The problem faced by the fund was one of imbalance between its assets
and it liabilities. The assets were the accumulated monies from prizes and
any interest in excess of outlays that remained in the fund. Congress could
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have refrained from increased liabilities, or it could have created another
source of revenue for the fund. The conXicts with the Indians on the
American frontier were never going to replenish the fund. The natives had
no navy from which prizes could be extracted.
Despite the changes, in November 1835, the fund still possessed assets of
$1,160,262 and the income for 1835 was $66,083. Expenses totaled $23,842
paid to 306 disabled veterans and $30,241 paid to 136 widows and orphans.
In assessing the implications of the 1834 legislation, the commissioners,
who were also the trustees of the fund, lamented Congress’s improvident
expansion of beneWts, writing:
It will be perceived that, by the act of 1834, a pension is allowed to the widow of
every person who may die in the naval service by reason of disease contracted while
in his line of duty; a phrase than which nothing can be more vague or more liable
to abuse, and which is nearly tantamount to authorizing a pension to be granted to
the widow of every person who may die in the naval service. To such an extension
of the pension system, the committee are decidedly opposed. (ASP-NA, 4)

Yet, by March 1837, the fund stood at $1,115,330, and interest and dividends exceeded $50,000. Despite the recent increase in claimants and
outlays and, importantly, without reference to future claims that would ultimately result as more of the War of 1812 veterans died, Congress once again
expanded beneWts enacting the “Act for the More Equitable Administration
of the Navy Pension Fund” (the Jarvis Act). This legislation required the
fund to pay pensions to widows and orphans from the dates of the veteran’s
death. In addition, the act stipulated that pensions granted to veterans
be paid from the time that they were disabled, not the date at which their
disability was conWrmed by the navy; thus creating substantial liabilities
resulting from the nonpayment of such beneWts prior to the act’s passage.
In other words, the act created substantial new liabilities without creating
any new source of funds.
Although the passage of the Jarvis Act smacks of Wscal irresponsibility, it was perhaps not a coincidence that it corresponded with a dramatic
expansion of naval personnel, a 50 percent increase in 1837 alone (U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1975). At the time, the
United States was once more embroiled in a territorial dispute with a European power. This time it was the northeastern boundary with Canada
that provided the source of the tension. In response to the international crisis, the United States began to expand its navy by increasing enlistments.
The buildup of naval forces began during the peak of the business cycle. A
wage series for “able-bodied seamen” indicates that real earnings peaked in
1836 (Lebergott 1964; see also Appendix A). Thus, the pension improvements may have been an attempt by Congress to increase the total compensation of naval personnel in order to recruit new seamen. If true, this
action reXects a basic understanding of the value of pension plans by
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both government ofWcials and potential recruits. If Congress increased pension beneWts in an effort to entice young men to enter the service, the panic
and subsequent recession of 1837, which began two months after the act
was passed, made higher compensation to seamen unnecessary as wages
throughout the private sector dropped substantially thereafter (Thorp 1926).
The commissioners of the pension fund opposed this expansion of
beneWts and especially the payment of back pension beneWts (required by
the Jarvis Act), which ran as high as $6,000 to $8,000 per beneWciary. These
payments were apparently for long-ago injuries that eventually resulted in
disability or death. Each of these lump sum awards represented approximately 5 to 9 percent of the total annual outlay prior to this legislation.
The annual number of pensioners was raised to 847 and annual expenditures rose to $103,120. “Arrears payments soon consumed nearly $600,000.
Between March 3, 1837, and October 1, 1838, about $725,000 of the
invested capital of the fund was sold, and the proceeds, with the interest
and dividend on the capital were applied to payment of pensions and
arrears” (Glasson 1918).
The sharp reduction in the size of the pension fund reduced annual
income while the increased number of beneWciaries sharply increased
expenditures, resulting in the further decline of the fund. Complaining
about the Wnancial pressures imposed on the fund by Congress, the
Secretary of the Navy reported that the provisions of the act of 1837 “involving arrearage commencing many years anterior to its passage” had severely
damaged the long-run viability of the fund. Primarily, this was due to the
Wrst section of the act, which provided that pensions to widows and orphans
“shall be paid from the date of the demise of the husband or fathers. The
only condition is, that the demise shall have happened in the naval service”
(U.S. Senate 1839). The Secretary concluded that “Arrearage of pensions
for more than thirty-seven years, in one instance involving the payment of
more than $20,000, have been paid under this section which has mainly
caused the rapid diminution of a fund originally constituted for the sole
purpose of providing for ofWcers and seamen only, disabled in naval service” (U.S. Senate 1839). The 1839 report of the Secretary of the Navy also
noted that the second section of the act of 1837 contributed to the increase
in expenditures of the fund:
The section of the same act provides, that “pensions which have been granted, or
which shall here after be granted to ofWcers, seamen, and marines, in the naval service, disabled by wounds or injuries received in the line of their duty, shall commence from the time when they were disabled.” (U.S. Senate 1839)

Previously, pensions had been paid from the time they were approved.
The lag between the purported onset of disability and initial payment was
what the act attempted to address. Following the passage of this act, the
fund declined in two years from $1,115,330 to $253,139. In summary, the
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Secretary concluded that “the primary source of the decline of the navy
pension fund is the act of 1837,” and he went on to note:
It is therefore certain that at the end of two years, at the farthest, the navy pension
fund will be exhausted. Under the existing laws there is not the least prospect of any
decrease in the number of pensioners or the amount of their pensions; and consequently, Congress will be called upon to . . . make good any deWciency in the navy
pension fund arising out of its own legislation. (U.S. Senate 1839)

Just as the Secretary predicted, two years later, with the pension fund facing total liquidation, Congress passed new legislation in August of 1841
appropriating $139,666 to provide for the continued payment of pensions
to current beneWciaries until the close of the next session of Congress.
BeneWts would not be paid to widows and orphans of men who died after
the passage of this act. In 1842, Congress appropriated another $84,951
and formally repealed the (arrears) act of 1837. In 1843, Congress began
the practice of passing authorization for the payment of two years worth of
beneWts from general tax revenues (Glasson 1918). The navy pension fund
was dead.

A Pension Plan for Privateers
The navy pension fund was not the only such fund in existence for U.S.
seamen during the antebellum era. As noted, Jay’s Treaty eased tensions
between the United States and Great Britain for nearly a decade; however,
by 1807, circumstances had changed. The British blockade of the European continent and related circumstances, including the impressment of
American seamen, led to Jefferson’s embargo. Although the Embargo Act
was subsequently repealed, there was no easy way to continue a proWtable
Atlantic trade and simultaneously steer clear of the maritime war among
the European powers. Napoleon had shut off the continent to the British;
while the British had shut off Napoleon from the rest of world. As a result
of these efforts, relations between the United States and both Britain and
France had deteriorated during the naval war between the two European
powers; however, the British had pursued a more aggressive and effective
naval policy against the United States. Last minute French diplomatic
efforts swayed U.S. policy toward Napoleon, and so in June 1812, war was
declared on Britain.
At the time war was declared, the U.S. navy was quite small by British
standards; however, as noted in Chapter 3, privateers played an important
role in western naval warfare until the mid-nineteenth century. Indeed, most
of the prize cases that eventually found their way into the federal courts in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries involved the questionable practices of privateers or those who claimed to be privateers. During
the War of 1812, Congress began once again commissioning privateers
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for the sea war against the British. The U.S. privateers of the War of 1812
proved to be a colorful and effective force. Following the economic
logic discussed in the previous chapter, in the same month that war was
declared, Congress created a pension fund for privateers. It proved to be
money well spent. In a report to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1830
on a review of the history and operation of their pension fund, a group of
surviving privateers reported “the interesting fact that our private armed
ships captured more British seamen, during the last war, than the whole of
our gallant navy” (ASP-NA, 4: no. 185).
Unlike the navy pension fund, the privateer pension fund was supervised
solely by the Secretary of the Navy. Congress directed that 2 percent of
all U.S. prize monies collected from the privateer’s actions be allocated to
this fund. By 1820, the fund had a balance of $213,535 and was paying
$20,700 annually to 254 privateers, widows, and orphans. Like the rules governing eligibility for a navy pension, the privateer’s fund eventually covered
seamen and their widows and orphans who died or were disabled “in consequence” of accidents or casualties in the line of duty. The fund’s assets
were invested in 6-percent treasury bonds. By 1829, the balance in the fund
had fallen to $63,272, yielding only $4,210 in interest annually. The latter
amount was substantially below that required to pay annual pensions. By
1830, the fund had declined to $53,115 and was earning no interest “as the
stock in which it was invested has been redeemed” (ASP-NA,1830, 3: 496).
In other words, as part of the general reduction in the federal debt during
the 1820s and early 1830s, the treasury had redeemed the bonds held by the
fund and replaced them with a cash balance. Not surprisingly, the fund
eventually went bankrupt in 1837. Interestingly, unlike the annuitants covered by the U.S. navy pension plan, Congress did not immediately make
whole the 36 privateers who were still receiving $2,900 in pension payments
annually. However, in 1844, Congress reinstated pension payments from
annual appropriations and granted back pension payments dating from
July 1, 1837.

Assessment of the Naval Pension Plan
Between 1800 and 1840, the U.S. government operated a separate pension
plan for the navy, and the plan was separate from the other accounts of the
federal government. While the beneWts and coverage of this plan were similar to those of the army plan, the funding was considerably different.
Instead of using general revenues or employee contributions, this pension
plan was funded from the sale of prizes captured by the navy. Of course,
this made funding highly variable from year to year and only tangentially
related to expected beneWts. At the time, the unique aspect of this pension
system was that the government was managing a pension portfolio in the
early nineteenth century and that the trustees of the plan were allowed to
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invest these monies in private equities as well as government securities. In
addition, Congress created a pension plan for U.S. privateers, and in some
key respects, the history of that plan followed that of the navy’s plan.
The history of the legislation covering navy pensions before the Civil War
shows that in general Congress could not resist the temptation to expand
coverage and beneWts when the trust fund seemed to be large and growing—regardless of the fund’s future liabilities. Congress continually pushed
beneWts beyond the fund’s actuarial capacity to support promised beneWts
from the monies held in trust. The actions of Congress along with poor
investment decisions by the trustees ultimately resulted in a shift of pension
liability from the trust fund itself to taxpayers in general. The details of the
management of the pension fund, actions by Congress, and investment
choices are reported in Chapters 5 through 7.
Notes
1. The material in this section relies heavily on the accounts of Paullin (1906).
2. The history of the Continental Navy is from Miller (1997) and Paullin (1906).
3. The Wgures on the size of the early navy are estimates (U.S. Bureau of the
Census 1975).
4. Appendix A to this volume provides both a historical price index and reproduces Lebergott’s wage index so that the interested reader can evaluate the real
value of these wages and beneWts.
5. Through 1836 these data are from the various annual reports by the commissioners of the navy pension fund; thereafter, the Wgures are from the annual reports
of the Secretary of the Navy, which were required by Congress.

